A tale of two oppositions
The recent Tehran protests against President Ahmadinejad’s election ‘victory’ appear to gather momentum each day and, in no small way, serve to remind me of what could have occurred in the aftermath to Lebanon’s general election 10 days ago.
It is with catharsis that we view the different reactions to electoral defeat between the countries’ opposition parties.
In Lebanon, the Hizbullah-lead March 8 bloc – in spite of receiving the majority of the popular vote – immediately accepted defeat (apart from the notable excption of the Metn district.)
In Iran, supporters of the main opposition leader, Mir Hossein Mousavi, have taken to the streets in their thousands, chanting and demanding a recount with such conviction, that the Guardian Council caved in to the popular call. On Tuesday, it announced a recount of disputed ballots.
The different reactions indicate a number of things. Firstly, Iranians were voting on primarily domestic issues, such as personal freedom and the state of the economy. Iranian politics is not riven by the confessional divide that cuts through the Lebanese debate. Voters in Iran are so outraged by Ahmadinejad’s conduct precisely because of the power that their popular vote should wield.
In Lebanon’s quota-based majoritarian system, wherein each district is given a list of parliamentary candidate, each belonging to a sect, voting is largely done on constitutional and confessional grounds. There is no point backing, say, a Maronite candidate who stands for civil liberties if he is running in a predominantly Sunni area; he doesn’t have a hope of winning.
Iran’s President is directly elected by the people. Lebanon’s Prime Minister is allocated on the say so of MPs, elected to represent the people in legislative and governmental decisions.
In addition to this, the ‘opposition’ in both countries wanted different things. In Lebanon, Hizbullah seem perfectly content to remain in opposition, given a say in parliament with the power of veto. Indeed, the group could well prefer opposition, as any parliamentary majority party would be under pressure to cede arms to the LAF.
In Iran, Mousavi – while not quite the moderate that people paint him to be – stands for something that didn’t exist under the incumbent administration. For millions of Iranians, Mousavi represents civil liberties that are tantalisingly within their grasp. They were voting for change, the Lebanese were voting for the status-quo.
This is a rather crude simplification of the two countries’ constitutional differences, but it’s certainly true that Lebanon’s system is necessarily more of a fudge, in order to accommodate and appease its 17 different official religions.
Finally, international intervention seems to have played a part in both elections, albeit in differing ways.
Lebanon’s elections were conducted under the watchful eye of EU and Arab observers, thus minimising the opportunity for misconduct. The West was frantically offering its support – mainly, it must be said, to March 14 parties – and made it clear that Lebanon’s voice was one not to be drowned out.
In Iran, obsevers have been shut out, allowing any alleged electoral fraud to proliferate, as it seems to have done in some areas.
Add to that the independence of Lebanese security forces (everyone, M8 or M14, respects the Army) in comparison to Ahmadinejad’s thugs, and you can see why these two Middle Eastern states reacted so differently to their votes.
The demonstrations in Iran are a poignant reminder of the fragile veneer of stability in this area of the world. But so too, is the apparent unity of compromise produced from Lebanese elections.
The two could be acting more differently, but they both prove that democracy is balance. And, until all sides feel like they are given the chance to decide that balance, the world must not relax.
